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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

grand theft

A

a

transaction card, with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. He received an
aggregate unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Weatherly asserts his conviction and punishment for both the
greater offense of grand theft of a financial transaction card and the lesser-included
offense of possession of a financial transaction card, twice placed him in jeopardy for
the same offense and, therefore, violated both the United States and Idaho
Constitutions.
In response, the State argued that Mr. Weatherly's double jeopardy argument
could not be reviewed as fundamental error because "it is not at all clear whether the
'pleading theory' even applies under the Idaho Constitution."

This Reply Brief is

necessary to address the State's claim.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Weatherly's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Was Mr. Weatherly twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when he was
convicted of and was sentenced for both the greater offense of grand theft of a financial
transaction card and the lesser-included offense of possession of a financial transaction
card?

2

ARGUMENT
Mr. Weatherly Was Twice Placed In Jeopardy For The Same Offense When He Was
Convicted And Sentenced For Both The Greater Offense Of Grand Theft Of A Financial
Transaction Card, And The Lesser-Included Offense Of Possession Of A Financial
Transaction Card
Mr. Weatherly contends that his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution were
violated when he was convicted and punished for the greater offense of grand theft of a
financial transaction card, as well as the lesser-included offense of possession of a
financial transaction card.
The State argues that Mr. Weatherly has failed to show fundamental error. The
State misapplies the Idaho Supreme Court precedent governing double jeopardy and
the pleading theory.
On appeal, Mr. Weatherly argued that under the '"pleading' theory, possession of
a financial transaction card, as charged by the State, is a lesser included offense to
grand theft of a financial transaction card." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-13.) In response,
relying on State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368 (Ct. App. 2011 ), the State argues that
Mr. Weatherly has failed to show fundamental error "because it is not at all clear
whether

the

'pleading

theory'

even

applies

under

the

Idaho

Constitution."

(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.)
In Corbus, relying on Stewart1, Pizzuto, and Sivak, the Idaho Court of Appeals

found that "the available authority does not provide a clear answer to the question of

The Court's reliance on Stewart is misplaced as the Idaho Supreme Court made it
clear that the claim in Stewart was raised only under the Double Jeopardy clause of the
United States Constitution. State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 386, 389-390 (201 O).
1

3

cases which

in double

analytical

a

151
is

case law and

the

in

ignores State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522,524 (1996).
In Sivak, the Court was asked to determine whether Sivak's robbery conviction
merged into his felony murder conviction thereby violating Sivak's double jeopardy
protections.

State v. Sivak, 112 Idaho 197, 205-206 (1986).

The Sivak Court

specifically acknowledged that in addition to the statutory theory, Idaho has adopted
"the broader indictment or pleading theory." Id. at 206. The Court continued, "[t]his
theory holds 'that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the information as a
means or element of the commission of the higher offense."'
Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 301 (1960).)

Id. (quoting State v.

The Sivak Court cautioned that under the

pleading theory, "the issue is analyzed in reference to the facts of each case." Id. The
Court noted that it would reach the same conclusion under the statutory test or the
pleading theory.

Id. at 211 n.8.

Then in Pizzuto, the Idaho Supreme Court again

addressed the claim to whether robbery was the lesser included offense of felony
murder. Id. State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 756-757 (1991). Relying extensively on
Sivak, the Pizzuto Court again found a double jeopardy violation under both the Idaho

Constitution and the United States Constitution. Id. at 758. The Court implied that it

would reach the same conclusion applying either the statutory test or pleading theory.
Id.

Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197 (1986); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991); State v. Stewart,
149 Idaho 383 (2010).
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While the Corbus
a

standard
cases

cites both Pizzuto and Sivak for the proposition that they
it is

review

as

was

same

State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980).

Moreover, in each case, the Idaho

Supreme Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to relief under either theory.
Even if Sivak and Pizzuto somehow articulated a different analysis under the pleading
theory, they were overruled in 1997 by Curtis, supra, which was not cited by the Court
of Appeals in Corbus.

In Curtis, this Court reiterated that:

There are two theories under which a particular offense may be
determined to be a lesser included offense of a charged offense. Under
the first theory, a court will determine whether a crime is a lesser included
offense by first looking to the statute defining the crime and ascertaining if
the matter urged as a lesser included offense is one that is necessarily
included in that crime which is defined in the particular statute. This theory
has been referred to as the "statutory theory."
Under the second theory a court will look to see if the information
(complaint) charges the accused with a crime the proof of which
necessarily includes the proof of the acts which constitute the lesser
included offense. This theory is referred to as the "pleading theory."

Curtis, 130 Idaho at 524 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho
525 (2011) (applying the pleading theory and holding that sexual abuse of a minor is not
a lesser included offense of lewd conduct because it was not alleged that he committed

the crime of sex abuse as a means of committing lewd conduct). In the instant case,
Mr. Weatherly asserts, as alleged in the charging documents, the crime of possession
of a financial transaction card is a lesser included offense to grand theft by use of a
financial transaction card. This is so because the factual predicate for the commission
of both offenses was the same. That is, Mr. Weatherly's possession of the card was the
factual means by which he committed

offense of

5

by use of a financial

card.

was

in

a

to
Mr. Weatherly's

or

of a financial transaction card was the means of committing the offense of
grand theft by use of a financial transaction card.
The State concedes that Mr. Weatherly's "argument that one cannot steal a
financial transaction card without possessing it, and that criminal possession of a
financial transaction card is thus a lesser included offense of grand theft," may be a
plausible argument, had it been raised below.

(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) The State

claims that Mr. Weatherly cannot show "plain error" due to the lack of precedent-that
there are no Idaho appellate court decisions in which the court specifically considered
the issue. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) The State claims that, because there is no Idaho
case law in which an appellate court considered the issue of whether grand theft of a
financial transaction card constitutes criminal possession of a financial transaction card,
Mr. Weatherly cannot show plain error. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) The State references

Corbus in support of this proposition; however, Corbus does not stand for this
proposition and is distinguishable because the Corbus Court, when analyzing the
defendant's claim that he had been subjected to multiple convictions and punishments
under the Idaho Constitution, relied on federal law and referenced multiple federal
cases in which there was a circuit split as to the legal issue; thus, the law was not clear
for that reason.

Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372.

Such is not the case here as

Mr. Weatherly's claim is capable of review and determination based on the statutes and
pleadings.

6

CONCLUSION

a
a new
DATED this

5th

day of January, 2016.

Public Defender
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